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Network Externalities and Composite IT Goods: An Empirical
Investigation of the WWW Software Market
John M. Gallaugher
Carroll School of Management
Boston College
Yu-Ming Wang
College of Commerce
National Taiwan University
Abstract
This paper uses the WWW software market to empirically test the network externalities hypothesis in a market
of composite goods. Among the results is that vendors that provide both components to a composite goods
market (e.g. client and server) enjoy a higher price premium than do single product (e.g. server) providers.

Introduction
Consumers value many products and services based on both intrinsic features as well as on the size of the product’s network
(installed base). As a result, we see that in many industries, consumers are willing to pay more for products and services that
are market leaders. This results from a phenomenon that economists call positive consumption network externalities. When
network externalities are present, the valuation which consumers place on a product or service will increase as the installed base
(or network) expands (e.g. Katz and Shapiro 1985).
This concept may be particularly important for information technology. Any product with a larger installed base will be
able to foster a greater level of value-enhancing exchange among adopters (e.g. of information, money, programs). Network
theory suggests that consumers recognize these advantages and should be willing to pay more for IT products and services that
are dominant in their respective markets, all else equal. Empirical verification of this concept has been performed using the PC
spreadsheet market as a context (Bryjolfsson and Kemerer 1996; Gandal 1995, 1994).
Many types of IT markets can be referred to as composite markets, that is more than one class of product is required to derive
utility. Examples of composite markets in IT include hardware/software, client/server, and content authoring/content viewer
markets. Firms participating in such markets have a choice to produce either component of the composite mix, or both
components. Gogan and Applegate (1995) suggest that some practitioners have found this choice particularly troubling.
However, no study to date has attempted to identify whether there are advantages to providing the market with both components.
This work presents results using the market for WWW software as a context to empirically examine whether IT products from
integrated providers enjoy a price premium over those from single component manufacturers. The finding that there is a price
premium for firms producing both components may have broad strategic implications for firms participating in composite IT
markets. Researchers should also find the results interesting, given the relative lack of empirical work on network externalities
in IT, and the absence of work studying composite IT products.

Model
Brynjolfsson and Kemerer’s (1996) generic model for testing network externalities among computer software is used as the
base model for this research. Their model uses price as a proxy for the value the average consumer places on a product. This
model is extended here to account for the uniqueness of network externalities among composite goods. In cases of composite
products, firms providing a primary product (e.g. servers) may also provide the market with its requisite complement (e.g.
browsers). The extended model is expressed as:
Pi ' f(Fi, N S i, Si, N &vi, 0i) where:
Pi = price of product i
Fi = product feature attributes of primary product
Nsi = the installed base of the primary product
Si = standards attributes of primary product
Nvi = the installed base of the complement component
Oi = other variables influencing price

-296-

Context
The context of this study is the market for WWW software. The structure of this market provides an excellent context for
examining network externalities in composite goods markets since two products are necessary for a user to derive utility – a
client (employed by the user) and a server (employed by the content provider). The market is also worthy of study given that
1) the Web is one of the most rapidly adopted information technologies and impacts many constituencies, 2) many network
technologies (e.g. audio, video, push) are evolving that have a composite structure resembling web software, and 3) issues of
competitiveness and market dominance in the WWW software market are currently fostering great debate in government and
industry.
Since the context of this study is a composite good with split ownership, tests must focus on the value of one product in the
composite mix (i.e. network benefits as they are related to the price of the browser or the price of the server). Given that many
participants have chosen to provide the market with free browsers, an act that may be considered a market-seeding subsidy (e.g.
Katz and Shapiro 1994), the logical choice is to focus on the web server price as the dependent unit of analysis.

Empirical Method and Data
This study employed hedonic pricing expressed as a multiple regression model in order to test for factors influencing the
natural log of the server price. A similar method and semi-log model were used in earlier studies of network externalities in
computer software (Bryjolfsson and Kemerer 1996; Gandal 1995, 1994).
LNPRICEit = b0 + b1*BSHAREit + b2*SSHAREit + b3*DURATIONit + b4*DBLINKit + b5*SSLit +
b6*SHTTPit + b7*GUIit + b8*REMMit + b9*SCRIPTit + b10* SEARCHit + b11*UDIRit + b12*TRIALit
+ b13*TIME + e
The variables above are represented as follows, with the subscripts i and t representing the observation of product i during
month t. LNPRICE = log of the server’s list price in U.S. dollars, BSHARE = browser market share, SSHARE = server’s market
share, DURATION = the number of months a product has been on the market, DBLINK = 1 if server provides database linking,
SSL = 1 if server provides SSL security, SHTTP = 1 if server provides SHTTP security, GUI = 1 if the server offers a graphical
user interface for configuration, REMM = 1 if the server provides remote host maintenance features, SCRIPT = 1 if the server
provides a scripting language, SEARCH = 1 if the server provides a search engine, UDIR = 1 if the server supports multiple user
directories, TRIAL = 1 if the server provides a pre-purchase trial version, and TIME = the current month of the study (0-17).
Data for this study was obtained from public data, industry research reports, a content analysis of the press, and feedback
from vendors. Multiple sources of data were identified and used to ensure the quality and constancy of the data. Commercial
products from only one platform (Windows operating systems) were included in the study. The final data set includes a total
of 321 cross-sectional observations on 34 commercial web server products reflected over 18 monthly periods from August 1995
through February 1997.

Results and Interpretation
Results are displayed in Table 1. Model (a) shows the results of a regression performed with all variables collected while
Model (b) represents a refined model arrived at by removing variables insignificant below the 90% confidence level. The
expectation is that the collection of variables presented in the refined model (b) constitute an effective proxy for determining
an average consumer's willingness to pay for a Windows web server during the time period studied.
The full model shows a positive
Table 1. Regression Results
relationship with respect to price for the
a) WIN Full Model
b) WIN Refined Model
c) WIN Excluding BSHARE
network dominance measures BSHARE
Variable
Coeff .
t-stat
Coeff .
t-stat
Coeff .
t-stat
(browser market share) and SSHARE
Intercept
4.11
29.18
4.18
31.84
4.12
30.46
BSHARE
0.0095
3.21
0.0117
7.59
(server market share). However, the
SSHARE
0.0360
1.2127
0.1153
6.93
server market share variable is not
DBLINK
0.36
4.48
0.38
4.71
0.35
4.29
DURATION
-0.14
-12.74
-0.14
-13.49
-0.14
-12.87
significant enough to warrant a position
GUI
0.56
4.62
0.52
4.40
0.57
4.65
in the refined model (b). This suggests
REMM
0.49
5.12
0.52
5.78
0.45
4.97
SCRIPT
0.42
6.23
0.38
6.22
0.47
7.66
that during the time studied, direct
SEARCH
0.32
2.80
0.31
3.98
0.16
1.97
externalities related to dominance in the
SHTTP
0.10
0.74
browser market are more significant
SSL
0.54
4.12
0.56
5.57
0.67
6.44
TIME
0.07
6.36
0.07
6.43
0.07
6.21
than the indirect externalities of
TRIAL
0.88
13.82
0.91
14.90
0.86
13.74
dominance in the server market (e.g.
UDIR
0.50
6.98
0.48
7.06
0.52
7.73
n
321
321
321
Katz and Shapiro 1985). Although the
R-sq.
0.784
0.782
0.776
log transformation makes model
Adj. R-sq.
0.775
0.775
0.769
Durbin-Watson
1.906
1.934
1.901
interpretation a bit more difficult, the
F-stat.
85.651
100.976
97.592
BSHARE coefficient of 0.0117 suggests
that with all other factors held constant,
a one percent increase in the browser's
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installed base warrants a price that is slightly over 1 percent higher than its competitors (e0.0117 = 1.0117; or 1.17%). This
coefficient is similar to the result of model (a), which includes both SSHARE and BSHARE.
A model (c) was run demonstrating the impact of server market share when browser share is excluded. This was important
given that a high level of correlation between BSHARE and SSHARE was noted. 1 Running a separate model excluding
BSHARE from the variable allows us to examine the impact of SSHARE and compare it to that of BSHARE. Although server
share shows up as positive and significant, the t-statistics of browser share suggest a higher degree of probability of significance
(t = 7.5 vs. t = 6.9) and model (b) contains slightly higher r-squared (0.782 vs. 0.776) and F statistic values (100.976 vs. 97.592).
This suggests that the browser model is a slightly stronger representation describing the behavior of observed phenomenon and
that one may have greater confidence in BSHARE as a contributor to describing the behavior of the studied phenomenon vs. that
of SSHARE. However, caution in the interpretation of these results is warranted, as the separate models may not adequately
express the relationship between the BSHARE and SSHARE variables.
The variables for security protocol (SSL and SHTTP) and the ability to link a server with a database (DBLINK) may also
be considered as constructs for network benefits. Variables for product market share offer a more pure representation of network
benefits than do the indicator variables for network extending standards. However, the use of standards allows a network to
be extended to a larger number of applicable contexts (such as secure transactions) while the ability to link to external databases
provides the product with access to external data networks. Similar indicator variables for file accessibility and data access were
employed in Gandal’s (1994) study of the spreadsheet market. The full model (a) reveals that the signs of all three of these
indicators are positive, as is expected by the network externalities hypothesis. However, the variable SHTTP is not significant
at the threshold level and has been removed in the refined model (b). It is noted that SSL and S-HTTP are competing, although
not mutually exclusive security standards. Sample descriptive statistics suggest that the SSL standard (mean .4205) is much
more popular than the SHTTP standard (mean .1489). Thus these results may be interpreted as being supportive of the existence
of network externalities in this market as witnessed via a significant premium being placed on the more popular security standard.
The proxy for trialability (TRIAL) proved highly significant. An interpretation of this is that firms that offer a trial version
of their servers were (ceteris paribus) able to price their products nearly 1½ times higher than those which do not offer a trial
version. This may be taken as a validation of Nejmeh's (1994) assertion that the Internet can be a strategic tool for the software
enterprise. In this context, the Web allows the firm to reap advantages from distributing demonstration versions at a low, fixed
cost. This also supports Rogers' (1983) assertion that there is a risk associated with adoption and that trial versions of products
help reduce this risk. In this context, offering a trial version seems to have translated into a substantial valuation premium.
The variable DURATION (indicating the number of months a product has been on the market) shows a negative coefficient.
Software costs are highly weighted toward the fixed cost of software development. Hence a firm which has a product available
longer in the market is able to take advantage of scale-style benefits and can reduce its price over time. The larger duration of
product availability may result in more sales which work to 'pay down' the fixed cost investment, while product upgrades and
enhancements are achieved at a much lower investment premium than newcomers' ability to develop a new product from scratch.
Curiously, the significance and positive coefficient of the TIME variable suggests that server prices have increased over
time, all else being equal. These results are contrary to the quality-adjusted price declines over time identified in other studies
of IT (e.g. Chow, 1967, Gordon, 1993). One explanation for this effect is that as the Internet continued to grow, Internet software
was recognized as being more valuable to an organization and new manufacturers coming to market reflected this perceived
higher valuation in higher product prices. Further tests (not shown) demonstrated that the time indicator can be removed without
altering the interpretation of the results.
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The correlation matrix and VIF tests did not reveal any further concerns regarding multi-coliniarity in any of the models
tested
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